On December 28, 1949, the United States officially recognized the independence of the Republic of Indonesia. It marked the end of a violent struggle over the sovereignty of the Indonesian archipelago. On one side had fought the Dutch and their local allies, seeking to restore the old colonial order. Opposed to them were the Indonesian nationalists, demanding complete independence and the creation of a republic. After years of neutrality, the US was forced to intervene in the conflict in late December 1948. This intervention marked the beginning of the end of the Dutch empire, a more assertive US presence in the whole of Southeast Asia, and a transformation of the relationship between the Netherlands, Indonesia, and the United States.
The failure of abstention, 1945 – 1948
When war broke out in the latter half of 1945, the Americans were caught in the middle. Both the Roosevelt and Truman administrations had espoused anticolonial rhetoric before and were often critical of European imperialism in Asia. This went further than only words the Americans had started the process of granting the nearby Philippines complete sovereignty of its own affairs in 1934, an action that stood in stark contrast to how the Dutch governed their colonies. But American ideals clashed with the reality of postwar geopolitics. The Netherlands had become an ally, and supporting decolonisation would undermine this partnership. Both the Dutch and Americans believed that access to the Indonesian market was vital to its economic and financial interests. The Dutch also saw the Indonesian republicans as having collaborated with the Japanese. Therefore, they refused to consider negotiating a settlement with the newly proclaimed Republic. Unwilling to pick a side, the Truman administration followed a ‘policy of abstention,’ with the only demand made to the Dutch not to use American-made weapons against civilians. It was hoped that the British or the United Nations would bring the conflict to a diplomatic end.
This hope proved fleeting, with neither side backing down. Violence engulfed the archipelago. In late 1946, the British managed to negotiate a temporary ceasefire with the Linggadjati Agreement, but this soon fell apart as both sides started accusing the other of violating the terms. In the summer of 1947, the Dutch launched their first campaign of “police actions”, which the Americans compared to an old-fashioned colonial war. A final effort was made by the US to come to a peaceful settlement, even allowing UN-led negotiations to take place on the USS Renville. A tenuous agreement was signed in January 1948. Yet again, both sides began accusing the other of violating the terms of the agreement in the months that followed. Dissatisfaction on the Indonesian side almost saw the Republic overthrown by communists. Further negotiations were deadlocked, and pro-Republican groups continued to operate on Dutch territory. The situation seemed like it could collapse at any moment, threatening to fatally discredit the United States’ policy of abstention.
The second “police action”
On December 18th, 1948, the Dutch once again launched a “police action” into republican-held territory. The Dutch explained that the purpose of their actions was to reestablish peace and security, but by now, the Americans no longer believed them. Their actions were seen as “aimed, not at resuming negotiations but at imposing ‘surrender to the position of your government on every material point’.” Washington was horrified by its implications; an assessment made by the CIA on the first day of the offensive believed that the only realistic outcome was to strengthen the position of local communist groups and the USSR. Already in September 1948, communists had launched one failed uprising against the Republican government. If the Republicans were crushed, who could oppose the spread of Communism to Indonesia?
Once again, the Dutch had blown up the peace process with their police actions. This time, though, they had gone too far, becoming the disruptive element in the Indonesian scene. A CIA report summed up the consequences of this latest offensive as follows: “It has weakened the prestige of the United Nations, it may seriously jeopardize the contribution of both the Netherlands and Indonesia to world political stability and economic recovery, and it has certainly provided the USSR with a powerful propaganda weapon.” This would be a catastrophe for the United States global position, which was increasingly challenged by the USSR. George Kennan described the crisis as the most crucial issue in the American struggle with the Kremlin. Others feared that continued American neutrality would bring together a pan-Asian block, hostile to the West as a whole. The American ‘policy of abstention’ had failed to resolve the conflict. With the Cold War emerging, American neutrality became untenable. Risking alienating the Indonesians and much of Asia, only to avoid offending the Dutch colonial legacy, no longer seemed to be in the interest of the United States.
Outraged, and a little fearful of America’s standing in the region, the US began putting its foot down. Dutch policies endangered the US mission to battle Soviet communism. On March 15, 1949, the US backed a UN resolution forcing the Dutch to cease hostilities and hand over sovereignty to the United States of Indonesia no later than July 1, 1950. Additional pressure came from Congress, where many voices long had been critical of the Netherlands. The Dutch should restart the negotiations, or it would risk not receiving any more financial or military aid. As one Dutch diplomat noted, the Netherlands was especially reliant on the aid promised with the Marshall Plan. When the Dutch foreign minister complained that his compatriots found the new American stance “incomprehensible”, Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson summarized the American feeling on the issue. The Dutch were wrong, and guilty of aggression, he explained. With no friends left, the Dutch began to buckle under pressure. The Dutch government was unable to afford to prolong the war and was uncertain of its relationship with the US and the rest of the world should it continue its military operations. A final round of negotiations began in The Hague. It concluded with the Netherlands agreeing to secede sovereignty to a new United States of Indonesia. On December 27, Queen Juliana signed the final agreement, transferring sovereignty to Prime Minister Mohammed Hatta. The day after, the US ambassador handed out his credentials to the Indonesian government, marking December 28. 1949, as the start of official relations between the two countries.
After almost four years of conflict, the US broke its policy of neutrality. Either it would back the ailing efforts of the old colonial regime and risk a hostile Indonesia, or the Dutch had to get out. For the Truman administration, this was not a difficult choice to make. The world was entering the Cold War, and protecting the Dutch colonies was not worth the ire of large parts of Asia. And so, although the United States and the Netherlands formally became allies with the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in April 1949, the Americans also helped end 300 years of Dutch colonialism in the East Indies later that year.
This article was written using the following collections available at the RIAS:
BOOKS
Bootsma, N. A. Buren in de koloniale tijd: de Philippijnen onder Amerikaans bewind en de Nederlandse, Indische en Indonesische reacties daarop 1898-1942. Verhandelingen van het Koninklijk instituut voor taal- land- en volkenkunde 119. Foris Publications, 1986.
Campbell, John C. The United States in World Affairs, 1947-1948. Harper & Brother, 1948.
Hess, Gary R. The United States’ Emergence as a Southeast Asian Power, 1940-1950. Columbia University Press, 1987.
Thompson, John A. A Sense of Power: The Roots of America’s Global Role. Cornell University Press, 2015.
Westad, Odd Arne. The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times. 12th edition. Cambridge University Press, 2016.
Microfilm (digitally accessible)
The United States in World Affairs, 1948-1949. Harper & Brother, 1949.
“Dutch Relations with Other Countries Especially on Indonesia,” n.d. http://primarysources.brillonline.com/browse/dutch-american-diplomatic-relations-online-1784-1973/dutch-relations-with-other-countries-especially-on-indonesia;dadriib01020325.
United States. Director of Central Intelligence (Acting). “Communism in Indonesia,” 1948, 2.
United States. National Security Council. “U.S. Policy Toward Southeast Asia,” 1949, 23.
United States. Central Intelligence Agency. Office of Research and Estimates. “Consequences of Dutch ‘Police Action’ in Indonesia,” 1949, 9.
Microfilm
Acheson, Dean. Official Conversations and Meetings of Dean Acheson, 1949–1953. Microfilm, Roosevelt Institute for American Studies, reel 1-0285.
Trezise, Philip. Philip H. Trezise interview, May 27 1975. The Harry S. Truman Oral Histories Collection. Text-fiche, Roosevelt Institute for American Studies.
Stikker, Dirk Uikpo. Dirk Uikpo Stikker interview, July 14 1970. The Harry S. Truman Oral Histories Collection. Text-fiche, Roosevelt Institute for American Studies.
